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In Defense of 'Hybrids'. James R. Barth and Peter Passell. December 
2007. 
 
As this newspaper reported earlier in the week, more than half of all the hybrid 
mortgage loans built around initial "teaser rates" have been made to buyers with 
good credit. This suggests that the willingness to take big risks in the midst of a 
housing boom is not confined to the impulsive or the myopic. 
Using the same comprehensive database, Milken Institute researchers have 
unearthed other, equally surprising facts about the origins of the current 
mortgage mess. First, a majority of the foreclosures between 1999 and 
September 2007 were made against borrowers with prime-credit mortgages. 
Second, among subprime mortgages foreclosed in the same time period, teaser-
rate hybrids accounted for no more than a third of the total. 
While this percentage will undoubtedly rise in coming months, it just doesn't 
follow that hybrids are the true villain of the piece -- or that regulating away their 
use would take the air out of future housing bubbles. Indeed, we believe that 
prohibiting hybrids -- as Barney Frank's mortgage bill, passed by the House 
before Thanksgiving, would effectively do --  would erode the efficiency of the 
mortgage market by limiting consumer choice. 
Propriety data from the San Francisco-based research company LoanPerformance 
on some 80 million mortgages originated since 1999 makes it possible to trace 
the evolution of the current crisis. Hybrids, which offered low fixed rates for 
periods of two or more years before becoming adjustable rate mortgages, were 
not common until 2002. Thereafter, however, they rapidly became popular, 
peaking in 2005 before becoming an endangered species at the beginning of 
2007. 
But categorizing hybrids as prime or subprime is not as straightforward as one 
might expect. For while many analysts use a FICO credit score of 620 as a rough-
and-ready dividing line, there is a considerable gray area in lenders' practices. 
Using the loan originators' own standards, some 2.4 million (out of a total of 70.8 
million) prime mortgages issued between 1999 and the fall of 2007 were hybrids. 
In the subprime category, 3.1 million (out of a total of 9.5 million) mortgages 
were hybrids. 
True, a far higher percentage of hybrids than conventional mortgages have gone 
into foreclosure -- 9% of hybrids compared to 3% of conventionals. And that gap 
will almost certainly widen as the teaser-rate periods for millions of hybrids come 
to an end during the next few years. But, judging by the experience of the recent 
past, very substantial numbers of conventional mortgages will also go south. 
The money question, then, is how many foreclosures would take place if teaser 
rates had not been legal or if (as the House wishes) the regulatory barriers to 
using them had been more formidable. The answer is surely "fewer" -- but 
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In 2005-2006, at the height of the housing bubblemania, two-thirds of all the 
subprime mortgages issued were conventional fixed- or adjustable-rate loans. We 
find it implausible that more than a modest portion of the people with marginal 
credit who used hybrid mortgages to bet that housing prices would continue to 
rise would have been unwilling or unable to make the same bet with conventional 
financing. And what is true for subprime borrowers is surely true for prime 
borrowers, who have defaulted on more mortgages since 1999 than their less-
creditworthy peers. 
Why should we put up with hybrid mortgages if they make the end of housing 
bubbles even a little bit more traumatic? For the same reason that we put up with 
car loans with no money down and credit cards that are easy to obtain but charge 
premium interest rates. Any limit on the terms of credit exacts a price in both the 
convenience of credit and its availability. 
The one area here in which we think Washington could play a constructive role is 
in making sure borrowers know what they're getting into: A recent Federal Trade 
Commission study revealed a third of mortgage borrowers didn't know what 
interest rate they were paying, while half didn't know how much they borrowed. 
Tougher disclosure standards may well make sense. But, in the end, it simply 
isn't the government's  job to convince people that some financial risks aren't 
worth taking, or that housing prices can go down as well as up. 
Mr. Barth is a senior finance fellow at the Milken Institute and former chief 
economist at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Mr. Passell is a senior fellow at 
the Milken Institute. 
This article was published in the Wall Street Journal on December 6, 2007. 
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